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Abstract. Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark (1985) present operational axioms for an ethical index
of income mobility that are best suited for a two period world. This paper suggests a decomposition
ofthis indexinto twoterms:(i)anindexofstructural orsnapshotmobility, whichcapturesthe welfare
effect of differences in the inequality of the cross-section income distributions; and (ii) an index of
exchange or rerankings mobility, which captures the welfare impact of rank reversals between the
first and the second-period income distributions. Income inequality reductions and rank reversals
are always welfare enhancing. The properties of all the income mobility concepts introduced in the
paper do not require any new value judgements beyond the traditional ones.
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1. Introduction
Compared to an agrarian society, which has been the dominant social structure
throughoutmostofhistory,ourgrowth-orientedindustrialsocietyispresumedtobe
socially mobile and egalitarian. The recent availability of longitudinal data makes
the measurement of such a central concept as mobility increasingly possible. In
the words of the authors of a recent survey, the problem is that, compared with the
neighboring area of inequality measurement, “the income mobility literature is still
distressingly far from being unifie on how to measure mobility and make mobility
comparisons”, Fields and Ok [8, p. 586], – or FO for short, from here on.
Among the many issues that remain open, the main question addressed in this
paper is the distinction between structural and exchange mobility.1 To study under
what conditions structural, exchange and total mobility are socially desirable, this
paper uses ethical or normative mobility indexes. More precisely, it follows the
ethical approach originally suggested in Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark [3], or
CDW for short. They compare the actual time path of incomes received over a
number of periods with a hypothetical income structure that captures the notion of
complete immobility. For operational reasons, CDW make two key assumptions.
First, complete immobility is taken to mean constancy over time of the relative
or absolute positions occupied by the individuals in the actual first-perio income
1distribution. Second, the SEF is define on the aggregate incomes received by each
individual over all the time periods under consideration. This model is best seen to
a p p l yt oat w op e r i o dw o r l d . 2
In this framework, it is essential to distinguish between two types of rank rever-
sals ignored in CDW: rank reversals between the first and second-period income
distributions, which will be called 1/2-rerankings; and rank reversals between the
first-perio and the aggregate income distributions, which will be called 1/1 +
2-rerankings. The distinction can be illustrated by means of a pair of simple ex-
amples for an economy with two individuals. In both examples the firs period
income distribution is (2, 4). In Example 1, the second period income distribution is
(4, 3). Therefore, there is a 1/2-reranking; but since the aggregate income distri-
bution is (6, 7), there is no 1/1 + 2-reranking. In Example 2, the second period
income distribution is (7, 0), representing the same total income growth as before.
The aggregate income distribution is now (9, 4), so there is both a 1/2- and a
1/1 + 2-reranking.
Using this distinction, a novel decomposition of CDW’s mobility index is of-
fered, where overall income mobility is expressed as the sum of two terms: the
firs one, called structural or snapshot mobility, captures the welfare effect of the
change in income inequality between the aggregate and the completely immo-
bile distribution, once all 1/2-rerankings have been eliminated. Income inequality
reductions between the first and the second-period income distributions cause
structural mobility to be positive. The second term, called exchange or rerank-
ings mobility, measures the welfare impact of 1/2-rerankings, with or without
1/1 + 2-rerankings.3 No value judgments are imposed either on 1/2- or 1/1 + 2-
rerankings. However, in the presence of the firs type of rank reversals, it is shown
that exchange mobility is always socially desirable.
The rest of the paper is organized in three sections. Section 2 presents the
assumptions of the CDW model in a two period world. Section 3 contains the
decomposition of the income mobility into structural and exchange mobility, while
Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
The approach followed in this paper is meant for a setting in which the variable
of interest is income. Abstracting from the transition mechanism, the focus is on
the changes that can be observed in a straightforward way in longitudinal data sets:
changes in cross-section or snapshot income inequality, and changes in relative
incomes or in absolute income differences. In this context, an index of mobility is
define as a real-valued function on the set of time paths of income distributions.
Indices of relative or absolute mobility are sensitive to changes in relative incomes
or in income differences, respectively.4
Let there be n ≥ 2 individuals, indexed by i = 1,...,n,a n dl e tD be the
non-negative orthant in n-dimensional Euclidean space with the origin removed.
2In a two period world, let x = (x1,...,xn) ∈ D represent the income distribution
of an n-person society where individual i’s income level is xi. Now assume that
individual i’s income has changed to yi in a given time interval. Following FO’s
terminology, it is said that x has been transformed to y = (y1,...,yn) ∈ D,a n d
this so-called distributional transformation is denoted by x → y. In what follows,
in every distributional transformation x → y, income distribution x will be ordered
according to the “less than or equal” relation. Each individual i is characterized
by an income stream (xi,yi). Over the two periods, individual i receives aggregate
income xi + yi. The distribution x + y = (x1 + y1,...,xn + yn) is referred to as
the aggregate income distribution.
As pointed out by FO, while it admittedly confine the analysis to only 2-
period paths of income distributions, this framework permits to study both intra
and intergenerational mobility measurement, depending on the length of the time
period between the observation periods. In the intergenerational case, assume that
every parent has only one child. Then, xi and yi can be interpreted as the parent
and the child incomes, respectively, and xi+yi as the dynastic or family income. In
the intragenerational case, xi and yi can be taken to be individual i’s income while
“young” and “old”, respectively, and xi +yi his/her lifetime income. Therefore, as
in the seminal papers by Markandya [11, 12] and King [10], the next two sections
of the paper will be restricted to this particular world.
The ethical approach to measuring income mobility in CDW uses an intertem-
poral social evaluation function (SEF for short), F : D2 → R1,w h e r eF(x,y) is
the social welfare level associated with the distributional transformation x → y.
The income mobility concept actually explored is the one embodied in a welfare
comparison of the actual distributional transformation x → y, and a hypothetical
benchmark x → v: the distributional transformation which would have resulted
in the absence of mobility given the firs period distribution x. That is to say, mo-
bility indices are obtained by comparing the actual level of social welfare F(x,y)
with the level of social welfare F(x,v) which would have been obtained with the
benchmark distributional transformation x → v.
Let µ(x) be the mean of any income distribution x ∈ D. In the relative case, v
is define by v = (µ(y)/µ(x))x. Thus, the aggregate distribution in the benchmark
transformation, x + v, has the same mean as x + y but individual income shares
are maintained equal to the income shares in the firs period distribution x,i . e .
µ(v) = µ(y), µ(x + v) = µ(x + y),a n dI(v) = I(x) = I(x + v) for any index of
relative inequality I.
To make the comparison between F(x,y) and F(x,v) operational, CDW as-
sume that the only features of the distributional transformations x → y and x → v
relevant for the welfare comparisons are their aggregate distributions x + y and
x + v. Formally:
A.1. There exists a SEF W : D → R1 such that, for all distributional transfor-
mations x → y, W(x + y) = F(x,y). Moreover, W(D)⊆ R++.
3An income mobility index assigns a mobility value to each distributional trans-
formation x → y,i . e .i ti saf u n c t i o nM : D2 → R1. CDW suggest the following
index of income mobility in the relative case:
M(x,y) ={ W(x + y) − W(x + v)}/W(x + v). (1)
An immobile income structure is assigned a mobility value of zero.
The next assumption, which is also taken from CDW, refers to the welfare
evaluation of one-period income distributions.
A.2. There exists a SEF define on one-period incomes, W∗ : D → R1, and this
function is the same as the two-period SEF W.
The identificatio of one-period evaluations with two-period ones is question-
able, but it greatly simplifie our work.5 The remaining properties of the income
mobility index depend on additional assumptions on the SEF. For analytical pur-
poses, it is only needed that W can be expressed in terms of only two statistics
of the income distribution, the mean and an index of income inequality. However,
for operational purposes it is convenient to specify the trade-off between efficien y
and distributional considerations. Consequently, in the relative case the following
assumption is made:
A.3. For any income distribution x ∈ D, the SEF W can be expressed as: W(x) =
µ(x)(1 − I(x)). That is, social welfare is seen to be the product of the mean
timesanadjustmentfactorthatvariesinverselywithanappropriateindex(i.e.
a continuous, S-convex and scale invariant index) of relative inequality I.6
In this case, the CDW income mobility index define in (1) becomes
M(x,y) ={ I(x) − I(x + y)}/{1 − I(x)}. (2)
Contrary to descriptive income mobility indices, this ethical index allows us to
determine whether the observed income movement is socially desirable. Consider
the following two examples:
E1: x = (2,4) → y = (4,3);x + y = (6,7),
E2: x = (2,4) → y# = (2,5);x + y# = (4,9).
The initial situation is the same in both examples, x = (2,4).S i n c eµ(y) =
µ(y#) = 7/2, the rate of income growth is also the same in E1 and E2. How-
ever, it is clear that M(x,y) ={ I(2,4) − I(6,7)}/{1 − I(2,4)} > 0, while
M(x,y#) ={ I(2,4) − I(4,9)}/{1 − I(2,4)} < 0. The reduction in income
inequality in x+y relative to x causes M(x,y) to be positive, reflectin an increase
in social welfare. The opposite situation causes M(x,y#) to be negative, reflectin
a social welfare loss. Thus, the social value of income mobility in this approach is
rooted in an aversion to aggregate income inequality.
Notice that a distributional transformation x → y that involves only a change in
scale causes no mobility in the relative case, i.e. whenever y = λx for some λ>0,
4M(x,λx) = 0. In other words, in this approach income growth per se has no
mobility consequences. For M(x,y)  = 0, it is necessary that either I(x)  = I(y) or
that there is some 1/2-reranking, so that I(x) can be different from I(x+y).W h e n
this is the case, differences in mean incomes do affect social welfare and hence
income mobility, but only through their impact on I(x+y). The conclusion is that,
in this framework, income mobility and income growth remain largely independent
concepts.
Moreover,inFO’sterminologytheCDWindexdefine inEquation(2)isweakly
relative, i.e. for any income transformation x → y, M(λx,λy) ={ I(λx) −
I(λ(x + y))}/{1 − I(λx)}={ I(x) − I(x + y)}/{1 − I(x)}=M(x,y) for all
λ>0.7 Finally, notice that this mobility index is sensitive to the choice of the base
period. However, in a two period world this is not important because the choice of
baseperiodisnaturally givenbothintheintergenerational andtheintragenerational
interpretations: the income distribution of the parent generation and the “young”,
respectively.8
3. Structural and exchange mobility
3.1. DEFINITIONS
Apparently, the income mobility index define in Equation (2) reflect welfare
changes due solely to changes in income inequality from the initial to the fina
situation. One of the points of this paper is to clarify why this is not the case at all.
Upon closer inspection, income changes in Example E1 presented in the previous
section give rise to two effects. First, a change in cross-section or snapshot income
inequality from I(2,4) to I(4,3). Second, a rank reversal of individual incomes
between the first and the second-period income distributions, that is to say, a
1/2-reranking: in distribution x individual 1 is poorer than 2, while in distribution
y individual 1 is richer.
At this point, it is useful to consider a third example:
E3: x = (2,4) → y∗ = (5,2);x + y∗ = (7,6).
Both the initial situation and the rate of income growth coincide with those of
Examples E1 and E2. Given the symmetry of I,w eh a v eI(6,7) = I(7,6). Hence,
M(x,y∗) = M(x,y). The novelty in relation to E1, is that in E3 there is both
a1 /2- and a 1/1 + 2-reranking. Of course, any 1/1 + 2-reranking implies some
1/2-reranking (as in E3), but not the contrary (as in E1).
Examples E1 and E3 suggest that CDW’s mobility index can be decomposed
into two terms. One capturing the welfare change due to the change in inequality
between the cross-section distributions x and y once all 1/2-rerankings have been
removed, and a second one capturing the 1/2-rerankings effect with or without
1/1 + 2-rerankings between x and x + y. Therefore, from a formal point of view
what is desired is a decomposition of the mobility index M(x,y) into a structural
5or snapshot mobility index, SM(x,y), and an exchange or rerankings mobility
component, EM(x,y).
Given any distributional transformation x → y,d e fn e˜ y as having the same
components as y, but rearranged (if necessary) in the same increasing order as x.
The following decomposition of the mobility index is now introduced:
M(x,y) = SM(x,y) + EM(x,y), (3)
where
SM(x,y) ={ W(x + ˜ y) − W(x + v)}/W(x + v)
={ I(x) − I(x + ˜ y)}/{1 − I(x)},
EM(x,y) ={ W(x + y) − W(x + ˜ y)}/W(x + v)
={ I(x + ˜ y) − I(x + y)}/{1 − I(x)}.
The term SM(x,y) can be viewed as the income mobility associated with the dis-
tributional transformation x → ˜ y in which all the 1/2-rerankings between x and y
have been eliminated, i.e. SM(x,y) = M(x, ˜ y). Then, exchange mobility is define
as a residual, i.e. EM(x,y) = M(x,y) − M(x, ˜ y).9
3.2. PROPERTIES
Remark 1. Recall that I(˜ y) = I(y).S i n c ex, ˜ y, and hence x + ˜ y are equally
ordered, it is clear that I(x+ ˜ y) cannot be larger than Max{I(x),I(y)}. Therefore,
for any x,y ∈ D which are not scalar multiples of each other,
I(x) ≥ I(y) ⇒ SM(x,y) ≥ 0. (4)
Thus, whenever I(x)>I ( y) the structural mobility index captures the welfare
increase due to a decrease in cross-section or snapshot inequality. However, as
shown by the following example, the converse to Equation (4) does not hold. Let
x = (1,2,3), y = (1.21,2.00585,3.38415), x + y = (2.21,4.00585,6.38415),
and use the coefficien of variation, C, as an index of income inequality. Then
C(x) = 0.5 >C ( x + y) = 0.498533, so that SM(x,y)>0b u tC(x)<C ( y) =
0.500001.10
On the other hand, consider the case in which there is no 1/2-reranking, so that
˜ y = y. As pointed out in FO, in King’s [10] model there is no mobility. In our
case, all mobility is structural mobility and, as long as I(x)  = I(y), mobility is in
general different from zero.
In the presence of some 1/2-rerankings, it can be shown that exchange mobility
is always socially desirable.
THEOREM 1. Let x → y be a distributional transformation such that ˜ y  = y,i . e .
such that there is some 1/2-rerankings. Then, EM(x,y)>0.
6(TheproofisadirectconsequenceofPropositionA.1inMarshallandOlkin[13,
p. 139], taken from Day [5].)
If I(x) = I(y), then there is only exchange mobility. If, however I(x)>I( y),
as in Example E1, then structural mobility is positive. In either case, total mobility
M(x,y) will be positive. When I(x)<I ( y) and, contrary to the example in Re-
mark 1, SM(x,y)<0, then the sign of M(x,y) depends on the relative strength of
SM(x,y) and EM(x,y). Consider the following example:
E4: x = (2,4) → y◦ = (7,0);x + y◦ = (9,4).
There is a 1/1 + 2-reranking and, therefore, a 1/2-reranking which causes
EM(x,y◦)>0. On the other hand, since I(x) = I(2,4)<I( x + y◦) = I(2,11)
we have that SM(x,y◦)<0. It turns out that I(x)<I ( x + y◦) = (9,4),s ot h a t
M(x,y◦)<0, i.e. SM(x,y◦) is greater in absolute value than EM(x,y◦).
4. Conclusions
Until recently, the evaluation of an economy’s performance over time was only
possible with individual income data drawn from two (or more) independent pop-
ulation samples in different time periods. It is quite obvious that the usual compar-
ison in inequality or social welfare in terms of two snapshot income distributions
permits only a partial evaluation of the dynamic economic process. A convincing
criticism is conveniently summarized in the following quotation from Karcher et
al. [9]: “... since the individuals’ positions on the cardinal income scale rarely
remain unchanged over time, an increase in a snapshot measure of inequality is
clearly consistent with there having been a significan amount of equalizing mo-
bility over time. Only if all individuals’ earnings remain constant from period to
period will a measure of inequality or welfare give the same result irrespective of
the length of the accounting period”.
CDW’s modeling of the dynamic evaluation problem can be viewed as an at-
tempt to confront this criticism. Conceptually, they suggest that an income mobility
index can be obtained by comparing the social welfare of the actual distributional
transformation with the social welfare of a hypothetical distributional transforma-
tion that exhibits no mobility. Operationally, they assume that the social welfare
of any distributional transformation can be identifie with the social welfare of the
aggregate income distribution. In particular, under the type of SEF adopted in this
paper, what matters at the social level is the inequality of the aggregate income
distribution – a fundamental idea implicit in the previous quotation.
There are several observable factors in longitudinal data sets that affect the
inequality of the aggregate income distribution. What has been done in this paper is
to develop the idea that, within CDW’s framework in a two period world, it is use-
ful to distinguish between changes in cross-section or snapshot income inequality,
and changes in ranks. Accordingly, it has been shown how to decompose CDW’s
7income mobility index into two indexes of structural and exchange mobility which
capture, respectively, the welfare effect of these two types of changes.
From a conceptual point of view, it should be emphasized that all the proper-
ties of the different income mobility concepts introduced in this paper have been
obtained in a framework which, contrary to the seminal contributions of King [10]
and Markandya [11, 12], does not involve any new value judgments beyond the
traditional ones. In particular, the fact that rank reversals resulting from income
mobility have a positive effect on social welfare is a consequence rather than an
assumption of the model.
In situations where there are individual rerankings, the approach presented in
this paper is immediately applicable.11 On the other hand, whether the decomposi-
tion developed is useful in other income mobility models is an open question left
for future research.
Acknowledgements
Financial help from Fundación Argentaria’s Programa de Igualdad and Project
PB96-0118 from the Spanish DGICYT is gratefully acknowledged. The paper
has been presented in the European network Living Standards, Inequality, and
Taxation, finance by the ECC TMR Contract #ERBFMRXCT980248. I wish to
acknowledge many conversations with Carmen Vargas and Francisco Marhuenda.
Comments from the editor and two referees’ reports led to substantial improve-
ments of the paper. However, all remaining shortcomings are my sole responsibil-
ity.
Notes
1 As FO conclude, “All in all, the present literature on income mobility falls short of provid-
ing an exact, robust decomposition of total mobility into its basic sources” (p. 565). For another
valuable discussion of the difficultie involved in modeling structural and exchange mobility, see
Shorrocks [19].
2 See Markandya [11, 12] and King [10] for alternative concepts of income mobility in a two
period horizon.
3 It must be admitted that there is no consensus about what ‘structural’ or ‘exchange’ mobility
mean. In any case, the reader can always refer to the concepts introduced in this paper as ‘snapshot’
or ‘rerankings’ mobility.
4 For descriptive measures in this framework, see inter alia the relative indices suggested by
Shorrocks [18] and Cowell [4], and the absolute indices proposed by Berrebi and Silber [1] and
Fields and Ok [6, 7].
5 Shorrocks [17] justifie A.2 as a direct application in the intertemporal context of the population
replication axiom, usually assumed in income distribution theory in order to compare the income
inequality of populations of different size.
6 For example, CDW study the case in which W(x) = µ(x){1 − IAKS(x)},w h e r eIAKS is the
inequality index obtained according to the Atkinson–Kolm–Sen procedure which uses the notion
of an equally distributed income. As it is well known, whenever W is homothetic IAKS is a scale
8invariant inequality index. Alternatively, because of its nice additive separability properties, Ruiz-
Castillo [15] uses W(x) = µ(x){1−Ic(x)},w h e r eIc for c = 1,2, stand for the following members of
thegeneralentropyfamilyofincomeinequalityindices:thefirs inequalityindexoriginallysuggested
by Theil [20], and an ordinal transformation of the coefficien of variation, respectively.
7 On the other hand, given a distributional transformation x → y, M(λx,αy)  = M(x,y) for
different λ and α>0, i.e. in FO’s terminology the income mobility index explored in this paper is
not strongly relative or intertemporally scale invariant.
8 It is easy to show that the consequences of the base period reversal depend on the relation
between I(x)and I(y). Specificall , M(x,y)> =<M( y,x) ⇔ I(x)> =<I( y).
9 In this sense, this approach follows Definitio II in Markandya [12].
10 I owe this example to John Weymark.
11 In this respect, see CDW’s reinterpretation of Blackorby and Donaldson [12] tax-benefi model.
Consider also the possibility, as in Ruiz-Castillo and Sastre [16], of interpreting x and y as the
husbands’ and wives’ income distributions, respectively. Finally, for an analysis of the income mo-
bility induced by the income tax, as well as the measurement of horizontal inequality as the ex-
tent of rank reversals between the pre-tax and the after-tax income distributions, see Section 3 in
Ruiz-Castillo [14].
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